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Prescribing Arbitration to Cure the Common
Crisis: Developing Legislation to Facilitate
Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigating




Pennsylvania's medical malpractice crisis has been throbbing for
quite some time, and resolving it will likewise take time.1 Heated debate
as to the cause of the crisis continues between health care providers,
consumer groups, insurance companies, and plaintiffs' attorneys.2
Although unable to agree on a specific remedy,3 all interested groups
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University, 2006; B.A. Economics, B.S. Communication, magna cum laude, Millersville
University, 2003. The author wishes to thank Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau for his
insights. The author would also like to thank her family and friends for their love and
support throughout the writing and editing process of her comment.
1. See RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ANNA BARTOW, UNDERSTANDING
PENNSYLVANIA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 46 (2003) [hereinafter Bovbjerg &
Bartow]. Medical malpractice crises have plagued the Commonwealth since the 1970's.
Id.
2. See Kenneth Jost, Medical Malpractice, THE CQ RESEARCHER ONLINE 6 (Feb.
14, 2003), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2003021400 (last visited Jan.
17, 2006) [hereinafter Jost]. Health care providers argue that the legal system is the
cause of rising insurance premiums, asserting that trials take considerable time and jury
verdicts have been increasing at rampant rates, up forty-three percent from 1999 to 2000.
Id. Comparatively, trial attorneys and consumer groups blame the insurance industry,
arguing that insurance premiums are increasing because of a recurrent business cycle tied
to low returns on insurer's investments rather than to high litigation costs. Id.
3. Id. Health care providers advocate tort reform by way of imposing caps on
plaintiffs' non-economic, "pain and suffering" damages to remedy the crisis through
lowering medical malpractice insurance premiums. In opposition to caps, consumer
groups and attorneys argue for insurance reform asserting that damage caps will have no
effect on malpractice premiums. Id. at 16-17. Under the Commonwealth's Constitution,
caps on pain and suffering damages are not a reform option in Pennsylvania. See infra
text accompanying notes 57-60.
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recognize that a sustainable plan of attack is necessary to curtail current
problems.4
Increases in insurance premiums for Pennsylvania health care
providers, arguably attributable to litigation costs,5 are perceived as a
leading reason for the medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania.6
Home to approximately four percent of the nation's population, with
fewer than five percent of the nation's physicians, Pennsylvania accounts
for ten percent of the nation's medical malpractice awards.7 Staggering
trial expenses and jury awards are a factor in the Commonwealth's
medical malpractice crisis, 8 and alternative dispute resolution techniques
should be considered to aid in remedying the current crisis.9
The purpose of this comment is to discuss how arbitration can be an
effective alternative dispute resolution process for medical malpractice
claims when state legislation is adopted in support of the process.
Specifically, this comment will analyze proposed legislation to amend
the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act ("MCARE"),
which included provisions governing court-annexed arbitration,
agreements to arbitrate, and pending legislation requiring arbitration of
all medical malpractice claims. 10 Part II of this comment provides a brief
4. Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trust, Pew Trusts Invest $3.2 Million to
Research Medical Liability in Pennsylvania and Identify Possible Reforms (Mar. 15,
2002), http://www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideasitem.cfm?contentitemid=986&contenttype
id (last visited Jan. 17, 2006). All parties in the medical malpractice dispute agree that a
long-term solution is needed to protect both the future welfare of state citizens and
Pennsylvania's ability to attract businesses that locate in the Commonwealth in part
because of the quality and availability of affordable health care. Id. at 1.
5. See Bovbjerg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 25. Expenses associated with
investigating and defending claims and then paying settlements or awards constitute the
main cost of underwriting liability insurance. Id.
6. Id.
7. Peter Eisler, Special report: Hype outraces facts in malpractice debate, USA
TODAY, Mar. 5, 2003, at 12, available at LEXIS, Major Newspapers, Bglobe File.
8. See Bovbjerg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 25-28. Surveys of trials in 1996 found
that Pennsylvania's urban counties had approximately four times the rate of malpractice
trials as the national median. Id. at 28. Moreover, the national median award of verdicts
in cases taken to trial where the jury finds in favor of the patient more than doubled
between 1995 to 2000 to approximately $1 million per case. Id. at 26.
9. See JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
REFORM FOR THE 21
s
T CENTURY: A REVIEW OF OPTIONS (2005), available at
http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/Med%20Mal.html (authorized by S. Res. 160, 187th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) and "directed the Joint State Government Commission to
'study the feasibility of establishing an alternative to the existing liability system with
regard to medical professional liability actions"' and any effect it would have on
insurance rates) [hereinafter Joint State Government Commission].
10. See H.R. 1831, 189th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (pending) (legislation
to amend portions of the MCARE Act and to provide for mandatory arbitration of all
medical malpractice claims); H.R. 158, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003)
(unenacted) (legislation to amend portions of the MCARE Act and to provide statutory
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history of medical malpractice crises, discussing Pennsylvania initiatives
to curtail past crises in the Commonwealth. 1 Part II also provides a brief
history of arbitration in the United States, detailing the pre-emptive
nature of the Federal Arbitration Act, and highlighting the benefits of
arbitration in medical malpractice disputes.' 2 Part III discusses proposed
amendments to the MCARE Act including one with provisions
governing court-annexed arbitration and agreements to arbitrate and
another mandating that all medical malpractice claims go to arbitration.
In discussing the proposed and pending legislation, this comment
highlights the provisions that were favorable to arbitration of medical
malpractice disputes and calls for provisions that would have been
unfavorable to arbitration of medical malpractice disputes to be excluded
or reconsidered in future legislation. Finally, Part IV concludes by
calling for the Pennsylvania General Assembly to enact legislation that
facilitates the arbitration of medical malpractice disputes.
II. Background
A. History of the Medical Malpractice Crisis
Although medical malpractice litigation was infrequent during the
first half of the 2 0 th century, technological advances and increased
professionalism spurred a major increase in such litigation in the last few
decades. 13 Prior to the current problem, health care providers were hit
with two successive malpractice crises in the 1970's and 1980's.1
4
1. The Availability Crisis
During the 1970's, many commercial insurance carriers pulled out
of the insurance market, causing an "availability" crisis in the medical
community.' 5 Significantly, the few commercial insurers which remained
in the market sustained large unexpected losses resulting in medical
malpractice insurance premiums nearly doubling between 1974 and
guidelines for court-annexed arbitration and voluntary arbitration).
11. See infra Part II, section A.
12. See infra Part II, section B.
13. See Jost, supra note 2, at 11. But see Ann Nevers, Medical Malpractice in the
New Millennium: Much Ado About Nothing?, 1 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 45, 47 (2000)
(noting that the earliest medical malpractice case was in 1374 involving a surgeon who
was sued for negligent treatment of a wound); Christopher Snowbeck, Report Ties
Malpractice Woes, New Technology, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Sept. 22, 2004, at A-3 (stating
that medical malpractice lawsuits were recorded as early as 1820).
14. Jost, supra note 2, at 12.
15. Id.
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1976.16 Medical groups responded to the lack of coverage by creating
their own insurance companies. 17 Additionally, state legislatures
responded to the crisis by enacting legislation intended to regulate
malpractice insurance' 8 and reform malpractice litigation by way of caps
on non-economic damages, non-judicial screening panels, and
restrictions on attorney's fees collected by lawyers representing
plaintiffs. '9
Similar to the rest of the country, Pennsylvania was experiencing an
increase in the number of medical malpractice lawsuits during the
1970's.20 In reaction to the crisis, the Pennsylvania Medical Society
founded PMSLIC, an insurance company intended to provide coverage at
"adequate but conservative rates.,' 21  Moreover, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the Health Care Services Malpractice Act of 1975
("Act 11 1") in response to the 1970's crisis.22
The primary purpose of Act 111 was to make professional liability
insurance available to health care practitioners at reasonable costs. 23 Act
111 also created a variety of procedures for handling medical negligence
24claims, including an arbitration system. Initially, Act 111 provided for
Arbitration Panels for Health Care, which would have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear all medical malpractice claims. 25 However, in Mattos
v. Thompson,26 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional
the provision of Act 111 which gave the Arbitration Panels exclusive
16. Id.
17. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TASK FORCE
REPORT ON TORT REFORM, May 1986, 13.
18. Kathy Kendall, Latent Medical Errors and Maine 's Statute of Limitations for
Medical Malpractice: A Discussion of the Issues, 53 ME. L. REv. 589, 603 n.89 (2001).
A majority of states created Joint Underwriting Associations ("JUAs") during the 1970's
to address decreased availability of coverage. Id. The JUAs typically consisted of a pool
of the state's malpractice carriers with business being conducted centrally. Centralized
management was intended to provide stability, and the state legislatures guaranteed
solvency of JUAs, insuring physicians' coverage. Id.
19. Jost, supra note 2, at 12. California served as a model for other states with its
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA"), which limited general damages
for pain, suffering, inconvenience, disfigurement, or loss of quality of life to $250,000,
and also limited attorney's contingency fees in malpractice cases. Id.
20. See Bovbjerg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 2 (2003) (noting that claims rates rose
just before the malpractice crises of the 1970's and 1980's).
21. See Jost, supra note 2, at 12; see also Bovbjerg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 7.
22. See, e.g., Robert E. Kelly, Jr., Selected Statutory Law Affecting Medical
Malpractice Litigation (1991), reprinted in PA. BAR. INST., TOUGH PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 71 (1992) [hereinafter Kelly]; Gerald A. McHugh, Jr., Statutory Changes
in Medical Malpractice (1997) reprinted in PA. BAR. INST., TOUGH PROBLEMS IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (1997) [hereinafter McHugh].
23. See Kelly, supra note 22, at 72.
24. See McHugh, supra note 22, at 1.
25. See Kelly, supra note 22, at 74.
26. 412 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. 1980).
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original jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. The Mattos case
went to the Supreme Court with a detailed factual record concerning
problematic delays in the operation of the Arbitration Panels for Health
Care.27  Whether another alternative dispute resolution system would
survive a constitutional challenge is debatable.28
Additionally, Act 11 1 created the Medical Professional Liability
Catastrophic Loss Fund ("CAT Fund") which focused on the issue of
malpractice insurance.29  Pursuant to the legislation, the CAT Fund
provided a second layer of insurance beyond the physician's primary
coverage. 30 The CAT Fund required that health care providers pay a
surcharge to the fund to ensure that money was available to compensate
patients who brought medical malpractice claims. 1
2. The Affordability Crisis
During the 1980's, "availability" of coverage was not a concern
because physician mutuals were providing coverage for fifty to sixty
percent of the nation's doctors; 32 however, the "affordability" of
coverage spawned a second crisis during the decade.33 A continuing rise
in malpractice claims and payouts fueled an increase in insurance
premiums.34 In response to rising insurance costs, Congress enacted
legislation in an attempt to regulate the health care profession.
35
Pennsylvania adopted the federally created Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA") in response to the crisis.
36
Enacted to aid in identifying and disciplining physicians and other health
care professionals who engage in unprofessional behavior,37 the
27. Id. The Court noted that its conclusion merely indicated the inability of that
particular statutory scheme to provide an alternative dispute resolution forum in the area
of medical malpractice. Kelly, supra note 22, at 74 (discussing Mattos v. Thompson, 412
A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. 1980)).
28. See Kelly, supra note 22, at 74.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1301.701 (1975), repealed by Medical Care Availability




32. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TASK FORCE
REPORT ON TORT REFORM, May 1986, 13.
33. See Jost, supra note 2, at 12.
34. Id. Nationally, the number of medical malpractice claims more than doubled,
from 7.9 per 100 physicians in 1976 to 17.8 per 100 physicians in 1985, according to the
American Hospital Association. Id. During the same period, average payouts for
successful claims against doctors quadrupled from $17,600 to $70,200, while average
payouts for hospitals increased more than five times from $7,500 to $40,300. Id.
35. See Kelly, supra note 22, at 78.
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152(1986).
37. Kelly, supra note 22, at 78.
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HCQIA's two primary purposes were to: 1) create an information pool,
known as the National Data Bank ("Data Bank"); and 2) provide
professional peer review of hospital and other health care entities. 38 To
ensure that the HCQIA is effective, state licensure agencies are required
to report to the Data Bank adverse licensure actions taken against
licensed, certified, or registered health care practitioners and entities.39
3. The Current Crisis
Unlike both the 1970's and 1980's crises, the current crisis is not
attributable to a national increase in medical malpractice claims but
rather to an increase in payouts.40 Nationally, the median size of verdicts
in cases taken to trial where the jury found in favor of the plaintiff more
than doubled between 1995 and 2000, reaching approximately $1 million
41per case.
The increase in medical malpractice payouts has impacted
Pennsylvania significantly because Pennsylvania ranked high in
malpractice filings per population in 1992.42 Pennsylvania settlements
and awards rank well above the national average in both the number of
claims paid and the average payment amounts.43 As a result of ever-
increasing payouts and a comparably larger number of suits filed,
Pennsylvania's catastrophic protection fund (CAT Fund, now called
MCARE Fund) 44 has increased annual assessments on medical providers
even as it has reduced coverage by raising its own thresholds, leaving
ever-larger amounts of liability on primary insurers.45 Under the
pressure of having to bear more malpractice liability and investment
losses, four of Pennsylvania's major primary insurance carriers,
38. Id.
39. Id. at 79. Pennsylvania adopted and followed the statutory reporting
requirements under the HCQIA. Id. Moreover, the scope of the HCQIA was widened,
making the misdeeds of practitioners such as podiatrists, chiropractors, psychologists,
registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, pharmacists, and physical therapists
reportable. Id. Pursuant to the HCQIA, information must be supplied to the Data Bank
when: 1) there is payment on behalf of a health care practitioner to a claimant who has
brought a medical malpractice claim; 2) adverse licensure action has been taken by a state
medical board; or 3) adverse action has been taken by hospitals and other health care
entities which affect a practitioner's clinical privileges. Id.
40. Bovberg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 2.
41. See supra note 8.
42. Bovberg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 27.
43. Id. at 2. Considering the factors of(a) rate of paid claims and (b) average
payment amounts, Pennsylvania's total malpractice payouts adjusted for population are
twice the national average and are growing faster than average. Malpractice costs per
Pennsylvania resident are nearly four times higher than in California, a state with strict
limits on malpractice lawsuits and recoveries. Id.
44. See supra note 29.
45. Bovberg & Bartow, supra note 1, at 2.
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including Pennsylvania's largest, failed in the late 1990,S.46
In response to the current crisis, Pennsylvania enacted the MCARE
Act.4 7 The purpose of the MCARE Act is to ensure that quality medical
care is available to citizens of the Commonwealth.4 8  To further
MCARE's purpose, the Pennsylvania legislature expressed the following
objectives of the legislation: 1) ensuring that professional liability
insurance is obtainable at affordable and reasonable costs; 2) affording
patients who have sustained harm prompt and fair compensation; and
3) making efforts to reduce medical errors.49
Addressing the first two objectives, the CAT Fund was transferred
into the MCARE Fund and committed to the control of the Insurance
Department. 50  The MCARE Fund operates to pay the portions of a
claimant's awards that exceed the limits of the participating health care
provider's basic insurance or self-insurance plan, up to the Fund's
liability limits. 51  In order to sustain the MCARE Fund, health care
providers who operate within the Commonwealth must pay an annual
assessment based on their "prevailing primary insurance premium.,
52
46. Id. Between 1998 and 2001, the greatest threat to availability in the malpractice
insurance market was the insolvency of Pennsylvania's leading carrier, PHICO. Id. at 1.
Moreover, between 1990 and 1998, three other major carriers failed: PIC of
Pennsylvania, PIE of Ohio, and AHSPIC, an "offshore captive" subsidiary of the
Allegheny hospital system. Id.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 §§ 1303.101-910 (2002). MCARE Act was enacted on
March 20, 2002. Id.
48. Id. § 1303.102(1).
49. Id. § 1303.102(3)-(5).
50. Id. § 1303.712.
51. Id. § 1303.71 l(g)(2). Under the MCARE Act, current coverage for physicians in
compliance with mandatory primary coverage requirements is $1 million per incident/S3
million per annual aggregate. See Joint State Government Commission, supra note 9, at
9. In 2005, the MCARE Act mandated primary coverage amounts of $500,000/51.5
million, providing the additional coverage of $500,000/$1.5 million. Id. at 9-10.
However, pursuant to the MCARE Act, the MCARE Fund coverage is scheduled to be
phased out in two phases. Id. at 10. Phase I, tentatively scheduled for 2006, would raise
mandatory primary coverage amounts to $750,000/$2,250,000, such that the MCARE
coverage would decrease to $250,000/$750,000. Id. Phase II, tentatively scheduled for
2009, would raise primary coverage to $1 million/$3 million and completely eliminate
MCARE coverage. Id. Phasing out MCARE coverage is dependent upon the Insurance
Department's assessment of whether sufficient coverage exists in the primary market to
absorb the phased out coverage. Id.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1303.712 (2002). The annual assessment to be levied on
health care providers for the calendar year 2003 was forty-three percent. This amount
was reached because the Act defines "prevailing primary premium" as the schedule of
occurrence rates approved by the Insurance Commissioner for the JUA. Id. For the 2003
assessment, the JUA rates to be used were $500,000 per occurrence/S1.5 million per
annual aggregate for participating health care providers other than hospitals and $500,000
per occurrence/$2.5 million per annual aggregate for hospitals. See Sarah H. Lawhome,
Medical Care Availability and Reduction Error Fund; Notice of and Amount of
Assessment Action, 32 Pa.B. 5484 (Nov. 1, 2002), http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/da
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Finally, to address the third objective, the MCARE Act created a
Patient Safety Authority ("Authority").53 The Authority, an eleven
member independent body appointed by the governor and the legislature,
is charged with the duty to analyze and evaluate reports of serious events
and incidents involving health care providers and to make
recommendations to the profession to reduce the amount and severity of
serious medical negligence in the Commonwealth.54
The MCARE Act has had marginal success in alleviating the
medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania.55 Pennsylvania law does not
impose caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice
lawsuits. 56  A highly disputed topic, Pennsylvania's Constitution
prohibits legislation limiting recoveries for non-economic damages by
plaintiffs in civil cases.57 In 2004, state representative John Payne
introduced House Bill 2722 which would have provided for a
constitutional amendment to allow the citizens of Pennsylvania to decide
whether the legislature should debate limits on non-economic damages in
medical liability cases. 58  House Bill 2722 was tabled in the Senate
Judiciary Committee.59
Rejecting the notion that the Pennsylvania Constitution should be
amended,6° the legislature has turned to Alternative Dispute Resolution
techniques as a means of reconciling the current medical malpractice
ta/vo132/32-44/1971.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1303.303.
54. Hosp. & HEALTHSYS. ASS'N OF PA., AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY
ENVIRONMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA 6 (2002), available at, www.keepdocsinthevalley.org/
downloads/hap.pdf (on file with the author).
55. Id. at 7. It will take several years to realize the entire benefit of the MCARE Act
and related legislation because the legislation only applies to incidents on or after the
effective date of the Act, and the Act spread over a multi-year period before full financial
benefits are realized. Id. Moreover, insurers will likely wait to see what results occur
under the legislation before entering the Pennsylvania market. In the meantime, hospitals
and doctors continue to be burdened by increasing insurance premiums. Id.
56. See Jost, supra note 2, at 3.
57. See id. at 19. Pennsylvania remains one of only five states without the ability to
debate limits on non-economic damages. Medical Malpractice: Pennsylvania hospitals
issue statement on defeat of medical liability amendment, UPI, Aug. 2, 2004, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
58. See H.R. 2722, 188th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) (unenacted). See also
Medical Malpractice: Pennsylvania hospitals issue statement on defeat of medical
liability amendment, UPI, Aug. 2, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
59. H.R. 2722, 188th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) (unenacted). Bill 2722
was a proposal to amend section 18 of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution to
provide for medical professional liability actions. Id. Bill 2722 passed the House on
June 30, 2004, but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Pennsylvania House Bill
2722, Bill History, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WUOI/LIIBL/BH/2003/0/HB2722.HTM
(last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
60. Medical Malpractice: Pennsylvania hospitals issue statement on defeat of
medical liability amendment, UPI, Aug. 2, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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cri sis.61
B. Arbitration
Arbitration is a "private, generally informal, and nonjudicial trial
procedure for adjudicating disputes. 6 2 In the early 1900's, arbitration
was an unpopular form of dispute resolution because of judicial
hostility.63 In 1925, however, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") to promote arbitration as a dispute resolution process.
64
The FAA legitimized arbitration by making contracts to arbitrate "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."
65
1. Types of Arbitration Agreements
Two basic types of arbitration agreements exist. The first is an
"agreement to arbitrate" and the second is a "submission to arbitrate. 66
Both are legally valid under the FAA and are typically enforced as
drafted.6 7
"Agreements to arbitrate" sound in contract and are drafted prior to
a dispute arising.68 Pursuant to agreements to arbitrate, the contracting
parties agree to submit future disputes to arbitration.69 Agreements to
arbitrate are the most common source of arbitrations and typically appear
as a provision of a larger contract. 70
Unlike "agreements to arbitrate," "submissions to arbitrate" are
drafted after a dispute has arisen between the parties.7' In a submission
61. See Joint State Government Commission, supra note 9; see also H.R. 1831,
189th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (pending legislation to amend the MCARE Act
requiring mandatory arbitration of all medical malpractice disputes); and H.R. 158, 187th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted) (legislation to amend portions of the
MCARE Act and to provide statutory guidelines for court-annexed arbitration and
voluntary arbitration).
62. THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 1 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Carbonneau].
63. Id. at 49.
64. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) (quoting H.R.
96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. § 1 (1924) (Congress passed the FAA "to overrule the
judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate")).
65. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996). Although the FAA was not intended to be a source of new
substantive rights, courts have extended the reach of the FAA and have given the right to
arbitrate not only a substantive character, but a constitutional stature as well. See
Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 65-67.
66. Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 16.
67. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
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to arbitrate, the contracting parties agree to submit an existing dispute to
arbitration.72 Typically, the submission to arbitrate defines the specific
elements of the dispute, confers jurisdiction on the tribunal, and initiates
the arbitration proceedings.73
2. Supremacy of Arbitration
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence supports an emphatic
federal policy favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements.74 In
the 1980's the Supreme Court issued three decisions 75 that clarify its
policy favoring arbitration.76 The Court's holdings in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation, Southland
Corporation v. Keating, and Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, made clear
that the Court views the FAA as pre-empting state law.77 Moreover, the
Court's recent holding in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto78 further
supports the Court's view that the FAA pre-empts state laws governing
arbitration.
a. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
Moses H. Cone involved a contractual dispute between a hospital
and a building contractor.79 The contract between the hospital and the
contractor contained a broad arbitration clause.8° When a dispute arose
concerning costs, the hospital filed an action in state court seeking, in
72. Id.
73. Id. Court-annexed arbitration is an example of a submission to arbitrate because
the parties agree to remove a dispute from the judicial system to arbitration.
74. See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce
Requirement, What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 385, 396
(1992). Arbitration under the FAA has become "federalized" and is now the "applicable
substantive law of the United States." Id.
75. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983).
76. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 182.
77. Id.
78. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 571 U.S. 681 (1996).
79. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 6.
80. The arbitration agreement stated:
All claims, disputes, and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to
this contract or the breach thereof, ... shall be decided by arbitration in
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules Association then
obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement to
arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law.
The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
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part, a judgment that there was no right to arbitrate. 81 Subsequently, the
contractor filed an action before the federal district court to compel
arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA.s2 The district court stayed the
contractor's action pending resolution of the hospital's suit in state
court.83 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the stay and ordered that
arbitration be compelled.84
Upholding the Fourth Circuit's order to compel arbitration, the
Supreme Court articulated that the "stay frustrated the policy of rapid
and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements."8 5 Moreover,
the Court noted that Section 2 of the FAA 86 is Congress' declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.8 7 Furthermore, the
Court recognized that the effect of the FAA is to create a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability and that any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
88
b. Keating
In Keating, the Court examined the constitutionality of a section of
the California Franchise Investment Law ("CFIL") 89 which was
interpreted to require exclusive judicial jurisdiction of claims brought
under the statute. 90 Keating's claim against Southland Corporation fell
under the provisions of the CFIL, and his contract with Southland
Corporation contained an arbitration clause. 91 The California Supreme
Court interpreted the CFIL to require exclusive judicial jurisdiction of
claims brought under the statute and held that claims filed under the
statute were inarbitrable.92
Reversing the California Supreme Court's decision, the Supreme
Court issued an opinion in furtherance of the supremacy of the FAA.93
The Court reasoned that "in enacting Section 2 of the FAA, Congress




85. Id. at 25.
86. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
87. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25.
88. Id.
89. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).
90. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984).
91. Id. at 4. Keating's claim, brought on behalf of Seven-Eleven franchisees against
Southland Corporation alleged that Southland had breached its fiduciary duty and
violated the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law. See
Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 192.
92. Keating, 465 U.S. at 5. The California Supreme Court further concluded that the
CFIL did not contravene the federal legislation on arbitration. Id.
93. Id. at 17.
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withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration. 94  Therefore, the Court held that because the FAA is
applicable in both state and federal courts, Congress intended to prevent
state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, and, thus, the California law was declared unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.95
c. Byrd
In Byrd, the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether a federal district court may deny a motion to compel arbitration
of state law claims, despite the parties' agreement to arbitrate their
disputes, when a complaint raises both federal securities claims and
pendant state claims.96 Byrd filed a complaint alleging both federal
securities claims and pendant state law claims in a federal district court
despite having entered into a broker-dealer contract that contained an
arbitration agreement.97 At both the federal trial and appellate levels, the
motion to compel arbitration was denied.
98
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
and held that pendant state claims should be compelled to arbitration.99
The Court recognized that by its terms the FAA does not give a district
court discretion to determine whether to compel arbitration but rather
mandates that it do so. 100 Moreover, the Court articulated that the
underlying congressional intent of the FAA was to ensure judicial
enforcement of privately. made, agreements to arbitrate, and the Court
explicitly rejected the notion that the purpose of the FAA was to promote
expeditious resolution of disputes. 10 1 Thus, although the Byrd holding
did not promote efficiency, it did support the primary purpose of the
FAA.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 16.
96. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 214 (1985).
97. Id. at 215.
98. Id. at 215-16. The motion to sever the pendant state claims and compel
arbitration was denied because of the "intertwining" doctrine, which barred arbitration of
state law claims that were factually inseparable from claims under the federal securities
act. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 208. The "intertwining" doctrine promoted
judicial efficiency because courts avoided bifurcated proceedings and efforts to litigate
the same question twice. Id.
99. Id. at 224.
100. Id. at 218. "District courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on
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d. Casarotto
In Casarotto, the Court addressed the issue of whether a Montana
statute requiring font specifications for enforceable arbitration clauses'
0 2
was compatible with the FAA. The Court recognized that Section 2 of
the FAA declares that state law may be applied "if that law arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally."'' 0 3  Here, Montana's statute only applied to
arbitration agreements. 10 4 Thus, the Court held that Montana's first page
notice requirement which did not govern "any contract," and only
applied to contracts "subject to arbitration," conflicted with the FAA and
was thus displaced by the federal legislation.'0 5
3. Potential Benefits of Arbitration
Generally, parties choose arbitration over judicial adjudication
because they perceive arbitration to have inherent benefits over the
judicial process. In particular, parties to a medical malpractice dispute
who choose arbitration typically perceive the primary benefits of
arbitration to be: 1) reducing expenses and promoting efficiency;
2) employing more qualified decisionmakers; and 3) lessening the
trauma of malpractice litigation. 1
06
a. Reducing expenses and promoting efficiency
Malpractice litigation is expensive. 107 Arbitration saves parties time
and money because arbitration hearings are typically shorter than
trials, 10 8 giving parties to the dispute a faster, final resolution'0 9 and
102. Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 571 U.S. 681, 682 (1996). An arbitration
clause is unenforceable unless, "[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration" is
"typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." Id. (citing MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
103. Id. at 687.
104. Id. at 682.
105. Id. at 687.
106. See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 208 (1996) [hereinafter Metzloffl.
107. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical
Malpractice, 9 ALASKA L. REv. 429, 435 (1992). Evidence shows that costs of litigating
malpractice disputes exceed the amount paid in compensation to injured plaintiffs. Id.
108. See Metzloff, supra note 106, at 208. While the length of malpractice trials
varies considerably, evidence suggests that the median trial length is five days, but a
significant number of much longer trials occur. Arbitration hearings are typically shorter
because there is no need to select a jury, and the amount of discovery required is typically
reduced. Id.
109. Id. at 205. Arbitration is unlike any other form of alternative dispute resolution
because it is not a process designed to promote voluntary settlement. Instead, arbitration
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thereby allowing them to move on with their lives. " 0 Moreover, because
arbitration typically resolves disputes "once and for all," it is less costly
than judicial resolution, which tends to "encourage continued disputing
over the same issues" via the appeals process."'
b. Employing more qualified decisionmakers
One perceived weakness of the judicial system is the lack of
competence of "lay juries to decide complex malpractice disputes.,''
2
Arbitration can alleviate this weakness because it typically affords
parties flexibility in designating who may serve as an arbitrator," 3 and
how arbitrators are selected.1 4 In medical malpractice disputes, because
of a juror's lack of understanding of medical issues, analysts believe that
an arbitration panel that includes a medical care provider will produce
decisions which are more equitable and efficient than decisions rendered
in judicial settings.'
15
c. Lessening the trauma of malpractice litigation
Malpractice claims typically take an emotional toll on all parties
involved. Physicians accused of medical malpractice perceive such
is an alternative method to reaching a decision on the merits of a case. Id.
110. See James W. Reeves, ADR Relieves Pain of Health Care Disputes, 49 DiSp.
RESOL. J. 14, 16 (1994). Court adjudication may proceed over a number of years during
which time, the patient may incur additional medical expenses while the physician or
health care provider is distracted from her practice because of the lawsuit. Id.
11l. Amy E. Elliott, Arbitration and Managed Care: Will Consumers Suffer if the
Two are Combined? 10 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 417, 420 (1995) [hereinafter Elliott].
Although a case cannot be re-tried once a judgment is entered, a party's dissatisfaction
encourages an appeal. Id. Unlike disputes entered into the judicial forum, pursuant to the
FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10, an arbitral award can only be vacated when: 1) the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 2) there was evident partiality or
corruption of the arbitrators; 3) the rights of a party have been prejudiced; or 4) the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1996). Thus, the FAA does not
give courts authority to review the merits of an arbitral award. See Carbonneau, supra
note 62, at 586.
112. See Metzloff, supra note 106, at 208.
113. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 29. The competence of the arbitrators is
critical to the arbitration; thus, submissions or arbitration agreements will generally
outline necessary qualifications needed for someone to be considered as an arbitrator for
a particular matter. Id.
114. Id. Typically, arbitral tribunals consist of three arbitrators. The predominant
procedure for selecting arbitrators is to have each party name an arbitrator, and the two-
party named arbitrators then nominate a third, who will serve as the neutral chair of the
tribunal. Id.
115. See Metzloff, supra note 106, at 208. However, introducing a medical care
provider to an arbitral tribunal may create concerns of bias on behalf of the patient
because the patient may be concerned that a doctor will not decide a case in a manner
disfavorable to another doctor. Id.
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claims as amounting to "almost criminal conduct,"" 6 while patients
injured from purported medical negligence often incur additional costs
and stress in pursuing a trial. 1 7  Because trials are public, court
adjudication of medical malpractice often fosters resentment and
emotional trauma between the parties involved."18  Comparatively,
arbitration proceedings are private 119 and thus promote a more
"cooperative atmosphere for resolving disputes," with the potential for
maintaining the pre-existing doctor-patient relationship.
120
III. Analysis
Arbitration is a viable alternative to the current liability system in
Pennsylvania for the resolution of medical malpractice disputes. Debate
as to if and how arbitration should be regulated continues with the recent
release of the Joint State Government Commission's study of the
feasibility of establishing an alternative to the litigation system for
medical malpractice disputes.'
21
Although the Commission's study discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration and potential changes to current legislation
or court rules to make arbitration more accessible and attractive to
claimants, the Commission did not reach a consensus regarding
legislation to promote arbitration and made no recommendations with
respect to the use of arbitration.' 22  Prior to the Senate's resolution
authorizing the Commission's study,123 Pennsylvania's House of
Representatives passed House Bill 158 ("Bill 158"), intending to amend
the MCARE Act. Bill 158 included provisions that provided for court-
annexed arbitration and voluntary arbitration agreements., 24 Although
Bill 158 established procedures under which parties could elect
arbitration over litigation, analytically it was faulted in many respects.
Citizens of the Commonwealth should be relieved that it has since died
in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 1
25
116. Id. During lengthy trials, physicians endure prolonged criticism and a threat to
their professional reputation. Id.
117. See Elliott, supra note 111, at 422. In pursuing causes of action, a patient may:
1) need to take time off from work to testify; 2) incur additional bills for medical
treatment related to the injury; and/or 3) incur legal bills. Id.
118. Id. at 420.
119. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 1.
120. Elliott, supra note 111, at 423.
121. See Joint State Government Commission, supra note 9, at 1-7.
122. Id. at 103.
123. S. Res. 160, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004).
124. H.R. 158, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
125. See id. The Senate Judiciary Committee was not going to act on House Bill 158
before the end of the regular session. Thus, it died in Committee. Telephone Interview
with Greg Warner, Counsel for Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 14, 2004).
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However, although Bill 158 will not be enacted into law, it provides
an illustration of what should be included in future legislation and what
should be excluded or modified to assure that the benefits of arbitration
are attained in the medical malpractice arena. Moreover, House Bill
1831 ("Bill 1831"), if enacted, would amend the MCARE Act and
require mandatory arbitration of all medical malpractice disputes. 126 This
comment will discuss the provisions of Bill 158 governing court-annexed
arbitration and voluntary arbitration agreements and Bill 1831's
mandatory arbitration provision, assessing the provisions that were well
drafted and commenting on the provisions that should be modified or
eliminated altogether in future legislation.
A. Court-Annexed Arbitration
Court-annexed arbitration of medical malpractice disputes should be
used when it will provide the parties with a more efficient resolution than
would the pending litigation.'27 Bill 158 provided for efficiency while
maintaining fairness by expressly addressing the critical issue of who and
how arbitrators would be selected. 128 Specifically, Bill 158 mandated
that the parties' arbitration go before a three-member arbitration panel,
regulated allocation of costs, and provided for court assistance in the
event that a party could not select an arbitrator. 2 9  However, the
procedural efficiency created under the Bill was jeopardized by a
companion provision granting either party the right to de novo court
review of the panel's award.
130
Requiring a three-member arbitration panel is consistent with
standard practice and should be utilized whenever possible because a
three-member panel is considered to be the most effective and efficient
126. H.R. 1831, § 513.1, 189th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (pending). On
July. 1, 2005, Bill 1831 was sent to the House Committee on State Government and as of
the publication of this comment, remains with the Committee on State Government. See
Pennsylvania House Bill 1831, Bill History, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01LI/BI/B
H/2005/0/HB 183 1.HTM (last visitied Feb. 14, 2006).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. Court-annexed arbitration is
essentially a submission to arbitrate the claim filed. Id.
128. H.R. 158, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted). Other
positive aspects of Bill 158 included providing parties with specific discovery and filing
procedures. See id. As these provisions are procedural, this comment will not review
them in detail. However, similar procedural provisions as those expressed in Bill 158
should be incorporated into future legislation that regulates court-annexed arbitration
because the discovery procedures, although streamlined, are nearly analogous to
Pennsylvania trial procedures and would likely be attractive to lawyers representing the
disputing parties.
129. Id. at § 714(III)(A)-(E).
130. Id. at § 714(XI).
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of all the types of panels.13' Moreover, under Bill 158, each party would
have been afforded an opportunity to select an arbitrator and the selected
arbitrators would have then selected the chair arbitrator for the panel.
132
A procedure similar to this should be incorporated in future legislation
because it permits both parties to have an opportunity to select an
arbitrator who they perceive as fair, while maintaining the efficiencies
that the parties likely anticipated in electing to arbitrate the dispute.
Moreover, making each party responsible for the compensation of
the arbitrator selected by or for the party promotes efficiency and
fairness, so long as the party can afford the arbitrators from whom she
may select. 133 Under Bill 158, the parties would have been required to
compensate the arbitrators they selected and then share the compensation
due to the third chair arbitrator. 134  This cost structure should be
replicated in future legislation because it gives both parties a vested stake
in the outcome of the arbitration while affording the parties access to a
resolution that litigation may be unable to provide. 135 It must be noted,
however, that Bill 158 required an arbitrator to be "an attorney licensed
in [the] Commonwealth"'136 but provided no guidance as to what an
arbitrator should charge for her services. Notably, the market will likely
set the cost of compensation for such services, but without specifying
what the range of potential costs may be, the requirement that an
arbitrator be an attorney may make the process unaffordable. This is
something one would have to consider before agreeing to submit the
dispute to arbitration under legislation similar to Bill 158.
Furthermore, the federal judiciary's support has led to the success of
arbitration as a viable form of alternative dispute resolution,137 but too
131. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ALTERNATIVES TO
LITIGATION (1992) (on file with author). Of the fifteen states that have statutes governing
arbitration of medical malpractice disputes, eleven states mandate a specific size for an
arbitration panel, with a three-member panel being the most common. Id. at 18.
Moreover, the most common method for selecting arbitrators requires the plaintiff and
defendant to select an arbitrator; then, the two arbitrators select the third panel member.
Id. at 20.
132. H.R. 158, § 714(III)(C), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
133. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). The fact
that a consumer (patient) bears some of the costs of the arbitration process by itself is
insufficient to render the arbitration unenforceable. Id. After this case, a party seeking
judgment that the costs make arbitration unattainable has the burden of proof to show that
the cost of arbitration makes the remedy impossible. Id. Generally, considerations of
cost arise under agreements to arbitrate and not under submissions because the parties to
a submission agreement have a relative idea of what both processes will cost at the time
they decide to submit the dispute to arbitration.
134. H.R. 158, § 714(III)(E), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 106-20.
136. H.R. 158, § 714(1II)(B), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
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much court intervention in an arbitration proceeding is problematic.'
38
When a party was unable to select an arbitrator within twenty days of
being requested to do so, Bill 158 permitted either party to petition a
court to make the selection. 39 If a party were to petition the court under
this provision, the court would have been acting to support and facilitate
the arbitration in appointing an arbitrator, and in so doing it would have
been promoting the federal policy supporting arbitration. Thus, a
provision that permits parties to petition a court to select an arbitrator for
the panel when a party is unable or refuses to do so is a beneficial
instance of judicial intervention that would be appropriate in future
legislation regulating court-annexed arbitration for medical malpractice
disputes.
Comparatively, providing for merits review of an arbitral panel's
award is wholly inconsistent with the federal policy supporting
arbitration and is an unfavorable form of judicial intervention. Bill 158
provided for merits review of arbitration awards affording "either party
the right to appeal the award for a trial de novo in a court of competent
jurisdiction."'140 Essentially a statutory opt-in provision, 14' this provision
of Bill 158 undermined the FAA, as the FAA provides no means for
merits review of arbitration awards. 142  Moreover, merits review of
138. See supra note 62. Excessive court involvement in an arbitration proceeding
undermines the private nature of the proceeding. Id. Moreover, the benefit of efficiency
is jeopardized when courts become entangled in the arbitral process. See supra text
accompanying notes 109-13.
139. H.R. 158, § 714(III)(C), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
140. H.R. 158, § 714(XI), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
141. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 25. The Circuits are split as to whether
contractual "opt-in provisions" which afford parties merits review of arbitration awards,
even though the FAA provides no merits review, are Constitutional. Id. The Fifth
Circuit held that contracting parties who heighten the standard of review available under
section 10 of the FAA are merely exercising their contractual rights. Id. Contrastingly,
the Seventh Circuit held that parties could not contract to create judicial review. Id. The
question presented by the provision in Bill 158 is similarly whether a state can create
judicial merits review of arbitral awards when such review is not provided by the FAA.
142. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1996). Section 10 of the FAA governs vacation of arbitral
awards and provides that a party to an arbitration may apply to a court for an order
vacating the award:
1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
5. Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
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arbitration awards is generally disfavored.1 43 Under a provision similar
to the one in Bill 158, the parties could proceed through the arbitration,
and then one party could elect to appeal to a court for de novo review,
leading to more costs and time spent on resolving the dispute. All of the
benefits of arbitration are undermined if merits review is afforded to the
parties submitting their dispute to arbitration. 44  Moreover, it seems
unlikely that parties would elect court-annexed arbitration if they
recognize initially that either of them can appeal the award de novo
because it would merely add another layer of expense and time to the
resolution of their dispute. For the foregoing reasons, future legislation
concerning court-annexed arbitration of medical malpractice disputes
should not afford parties an opportunity to appeal an arbitration award
for a trial de novo.
B. Agreements to Arbitrate
State legislation directed at regulating agreements to arbitrate is
inherently problematic because of the pre-emptive nature of the FAA.
145
In Bill 158, Pennsylvania's legislature attempted to regulate agreements
to arbitrate. 46 Under Bill 158, the provision governing agreements to
arbitrate provided finality and efficiency because it recognized that the
award would be binding on the parties.
47
However, numerous provisions regulating agreements to arbitrate
under Bill 158 would be problematic with respect to the pre-emptive
nature of the FAA. Specifically, Bill 158 required that health care
providers who wanted to incorporate arbitration into their standard care
contracts needed to have a separate document containing the arbitration
clause and provide notice of the clause to the patient in 12-point bold
font.' 48 Moreover, Bill 158 carved out an exception to the generally
accepted principle that adhesion is permissible in arbitration
agreements 49 by forbidding execution of an agreement to arbitrate from
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
143. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 25. Most state courts hold that parties cannot
contract for judicial review. Id. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has found that permitting
expansion of judicial review through contract challenges the institutional integrity of
arbitration and puts into question the role and function that courts have adopted in
relation to arbitration. Id. at 272.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 106-20.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
146. H.R. 158, § 803, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
147. Id. at § 803(G)(6).
148. Id. at § 803(B)(1)-(4).
149. See Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 245. In pursuing the emphatic policy favoring
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being a prerequisite to a patient receiving care. 50 Furthermore, pursuant
to Bill 158, a patient and health care provider would have had to re-
execute an agreement to arbitrate every time the patient sought medical
care, unless the parties agreed otherwise.1
51
Under Bill 158, the procedures governing agreements to arbitrate
would have been similar to those for court-annexed arbitration" 2 but the
legislature expressly recognized the binding nature of arbitration awards
when an agreement to arbitrate was the origin of the arbitration. 5 3 In
concert with section 2 of the FAA, Bill 158 recognized that "a decision
agreed to by two of the arbitrators shall be binding on the parties."'
154
Although it may be redundant, recognizing the binding nature of
arbitration in legislation reinforces the finality objective of arbitration, 55
promotes efficiency, 56 and squares with the federal support of
arbitration. 57 Thus, including similar language in future legislation is
encouraged and should be considered.
While the binding nature of arbitration awards in the context of
agreements to arbitrate was recognized in Bill 158, the requirements for
constructing a valid arbitration clause under the legislation were
problematic and would not likely have survived a FAA pre-emption
challenge.158 First, requiring an agreement to arbitrate to be in a separate
document from the main contract violates Congress' intent that
agreements and submissions to arbitrate be placed on equal footing with
all other contracts. 159 Here, requiring that an agreement to arbitrate be in
a separate document earmarks arbitration clauses as being "different"
from other contractual language. Such measures taken by a state
legislature are pre-empted by the FAA and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 160 Therefore, requiring an agreement to arbitrate to be a
separate document from the main contract, although perhaps persuasive
from a public policy purview, presents a ground on which the legislation
can be challenged, and should not, therefore, be included in future
arbitration, the Court has nearly eliminated the defense of adhesion to the enforceability
of arbitration agreements. Id.
150. H.R. 158, § 803(B), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
151. Id. § 803(E).
152. Id. § 803(G). Similar to court-annexed arbitration, agreements to arbitrate under
the legislation would be conducted by three-member arbitral panels, with similar cost
allocation, evidentiary, and notice procedures. Id.
153. Id. at § 803(G)(6).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 111.
156. See supra notes 107-110.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
158. Id.
159. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996). See also supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
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legislation governing agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice
disputes.
Next, the requirement of font specifications in agreements to
arbitrate, similar to those enumerated in Bill 158,161 would likely be held
unenforceable. Similar to the Montana statute at issue in Casarotto,
1 62
the language of Bill 158 applied only to arbitration agreements and did
not govern "any contract.,' 163  Statutory provisions mandating specific
notice requirements that only govern agreements or submissions to
arbitrate are pre-empted by the FAA and should not be incorporated in
future legislation governing agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice
disputes. Notably, patients should be apprised that in signing an
arbitration agreement they are giving up their right to court adjudication
of any dispute covered by the arbitration clause. However, it is the
obligation of the health care provider to supply adequate notice, and it is
not the role of the legislature to mandate the specifics of how that notice
should be provided. 164
Moreover, adhesion is generally not a viable ground for challenging
the validity of an agreement to arbitrate, 165 and accepting an agreement to
161. H.R. 158, § 803(B)(l)-(4), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003)
(unenacted). Bill 158 mandated that on a separate document the health care provider:
1. Clearly provide in bold print in at least 12-point bold type on the face of the
agreement that execution of the agreement is not a prerequisite to receiving
care or treatment.
2. Clearly provide in at least 12-point bold, uppercase type:
a. Notice with regard to any terms or conditions of the agreement that
constitute waivers and rights affected upon execution, and
b. Notice with regard to the manner of selection of the arbitrators.
3. Contain the following notice above the signature line of the agreement in at
least 12-point bold, uppercase type:
By signing this contract you are giving up your right to a jury or court
trial.
4. Acknowledge the patient's receipt of the agreement and shall be dated.
Id.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 102-105.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 102-105.
164. COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT, (July 27,
1998), http://www.amaassn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/395/healthcare.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Commission Report]. Per the final
report of the Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution, comprised of members
from the American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and American
Medical Association, a health care provider should provide access to information
regarding an ADR program. Specifically, a health care provider should provide a
consumer contracting for goods or services with: (1) clear and adequate notice regarding
the ADR provisions including a statement indicating whether participation in the ADR
program is mandatory or optional; and (2) reasonable means by which consumers may
obtain additional information regarding the ADR program. Id. at 42.
165. See supra note 149.
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arbitrate is commonly a prerequisite to receiving a service. 6 6 Under Bill
158, "execution of an agreement [to arbitrate] by a patient may not be a
prerequisite to receipt of care or treatment by the health care provider."
' 167
In emergency situations, a provision similar to the proceeding provision
in Bill 158 seems very reasonable, as the patient may be unable to agree
to arbitrate do to lack of physical or mental capacity. 168 However, in the
course of non-emergency patient/health care provider relationships,
Pennsylvania would be compelling health care providers to produce
services under terms unacceptable to the provider. Such a result
undermines the settled policy favoring arbitration and presents a
potential challenge to drafting future legislation similar to Bill 158.169
Future legislation should only contain a provision preventing agreements
to arbitrate as a requirement of receiving medical services in emergency
situations where a patient is unable to knowingly agree to arbitrate
because of her emergent medical need.
170
Finally, the provision in Bill 158 which required re-execution of an
arbitration agreement between a health care provider and a patient every
time the patient sought medical care171 would have made arbitration an
unattractive method of dispute resolution from a health care provider's
perspective. As drafted, the provision contained a loophole by which a
health care provider could have a patient agree to an arbitration
agreement that would extend for a year, thus eliminating the need for re-
execution and rendering a portion of the provision superfluous.1
72
Perhaps more problematic, the provision would have still required a re-
execution of a patient's arbitration agreement every twelve months,
which would probably have been viewed, by health care professionals
who are already overburdened, as more cumbersome paperwork.
173
Moreover, requiring a continual re-execution of the arbitration agreement
may undermine the patient's confidence in the competence of her
166. Carbonneau, supra note 62, at 245. For example, arbitral clauses are typically
unilaterally imposed in non-union employment situations and in consumer contracting.
Id.
167. H.R. 158, § 803(B), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
168. See Commission Report, supra note 164, at 30. In the Commission's view,
participation in any form of ADR should not be required for a patient to receive
emergency medical care or treatment. Id.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
170. See Commission Report, supra note 164, at 30. Good practice dictates that
patients in an emergency situation should not be approached at that time to consent to any
form of ADR. Id.
171. H.R. 158, § 803(E), 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (unenacted).
172. Id.
173. See, Kinninger, The Business for Medication Safety, Healthcare Fin. Mgmt.
Association, Feb. 1, 2003, at 3 (generally discussing the administrative burdens placed on
nurses).
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physician. Thus, future legislation governing arbitration agreements
concerning medical malpractice disputes should not include mandatory
annual re-execution provisions.
C. Mandatory Arbitration
In order for arbitration to be an effective dispute resolution
alternative, the parties involved must trust the process itself.174 On its
face, Bill 1831 seems to embrace arbitration as a dispute resolution
alternative, requiring mandatory submission to arbitration of all filed
medical malpractice disputes. 175 However, provisions of Bill 1831, such
as ones which 1) prohibit the party's selection of arbitrators, 76 2) limit
the arbitrators ability to award non-economic damages to claimants,1
77
and 3) provide for jury trials in the event that either party is dissatisfied
with the arbitrators' decision,1 78 exemplify a distrust of the process
rendering arbitration ineffective as a final dispute resolution process.
Bill 1831's mandate that all medical malpractice disputes go to
arbitration makes preventing parties from being able to select a member
of the arbitration panel particularly problematic. Although an arbitration
panel would consist of three members, with professional backgrounds
suitable to rendering decisions in medical malpractice disputes,
179
negating the parties' ability to have input into the panel selection, which
is generally available in arbitration, may prove problematic. Party
selection of at least one member of the panel aids in promoting a sense of
fairness in the process. Moreover, the President Judge in most
jurisdictions undoubtedly has a full docket and many administrative
174. Interview with Thomas E. Carbonneau, Samuel P. Orlando Distinguished
Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, in
Carlisle, Pa. (Jan. 9, 2006).
175. H.R. 1831, § 513.1(A), 189th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005). "If an action
commenced against a health care provider cannot be settled by the parties, then the
parties shall submit the case to mandatory arbitration." Id.
176. Id. "The arbitration panel shall consist of three persons, selected randomly by
the President Judge [of the Court of Common Pleas of the relevant jurisdiction and
venue]." Id.
177. Id. "Awards at arbitration shall be limited to economic damages, reasonable
attorney fees, and not more than $250,000 for non-economic damages per plaintiff." Id.
178. Id. § 513.1(D). "Arbitration is an alternative to trial but does not supersede or
eliminate the right of a party to present its case at trial." Id.
179. Id. § 513.1(A).
"One of the three persons shall be an attorney who practices law in the
jurisdiction of the court; one shall be a medical professional who has a
primary residence or practice of medicine in the jurisdiction; and one
shall be a senior judge from the jurisdiction, or, if no such senior judge
is available, shall be a senior judge appointed by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."
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tasks; therefore, adding the selection of arbitrators to the position may
undercut the efficiencies of the arbitration process. Ideally, a procedure
similar to what was proscribed in Bill 158 for party selection of an
arbitrator should be utilized in future legislation.' 
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Moreover, in limiting a plaintiffs non-economic recovery to
$250,000 in arbitration awards and providing for a subsequent jury trial
with no limit on non-economic damages, 181 Bill 1831 may make
arbitration a meaningless procedural step along a plaintiffs path to
recovery. Similar to the problems of de novo review of arbitration
awards under Bill 158,182 Bill 1831 's provision which affords either party
the right to jury trial after an arbitration proceeding is wholly
inconsistent with the federal policy supporting arbitration and is an
unfavorable form of judicial intervention. Under this provision, the
parties could be forced to arbitrate, receive an arbitration award that was
dissatisfactory to either party, seek trial by jury, receive a jury award that
was dissatisfactory to either party, and proceed with the normal judicial
appeals process. Such a pattern of events would merely add cost and
delay to a medical malpractice dispute.
Perhaps, Bill 1831's compromise provision that parties may still
seek a jury trial is in response to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision that mandatory arbitration is unconstitutional. 83 However, to
preserve the integrity of arbitration, submissions to arbitration' 84 should
not be legislatively mandated for medical malpractice disputes. Rather,
legislation should be adopted which is supportive of submissions to
arbitration in so much as the parties choose arbitration in place of, not
supplemental too, litigation. 1
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IV. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania General Assembly is being proactive by
considering alternative dispute resolution techniques to aid in remedying
180. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
181. See H.R. 1831, § 513.1 (A), (D), 189th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
183. Mattos v. Thompson, 412 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. 1980). See supra text
accompanying notes 26-28.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
185. Alternatively, if the legislature will not enact legislation that supports binding
arbitration, legislation should be enacted that will at least prohibit parties from using
arbitration as a discovery tool. Interview with Michael T. Traxler, Esq., Abom &
Kutulakis L.L.P., in Carlisle, Pa. (Jan. 13, 2006). To prevent non-binding arbitration
from being utilized as merely a discovery tool, the legislation could mandate that parties
would only be able to present evidence at trial which was presented during the
arbitration. Id. An exception to such a rule, concerning the admissibility of evidence
discovered after arbitration, should also be considered. Id.
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the medical malpractice crisis facing the Commonwealth.186 However,
future legislation regulating the arbitration of medical malpractice
disputes must conform with the settled federal policy supporting
arbitration1 87 while making the forum an attractive alternative to the
parties involved in malpractice disputes. 88 If the legislature's goal in
exploring alternative dispute resolution techniques is to encourage
settlement between disputing parties in a private context that would
afford both parties a more efficient, cost effective remedy, then
arbitration alone will not further this goal.' 89
Beyond merely facilitating arbitration of medical malpractice
disputes, the legislature should consider a hybrid process of alternative
dispute resolution commonly known as Med/Arb (mediation/
arbitration). 90  In a Med/Arb proceeding, the parties first agree to
mediate the dispute and stipulate that if the mediation does not reach
resolution of the matter, the dispute will then go to binding arbitration
under agreed-upon arbitration rules.' 9' A Med/Arb arrangement works
well in situations where time is of the essence, finality is of import, and
privacy is essential. 92 Thus, some medical malpractice disputes may be
well suited for Med/Arb dispute resolution techniques, and legislation
that facilitates such a procedure would also be helpful in curtailing the
medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania.
Now is the time for the Pennsylvania General Assembly to cure the
medical malpractice crisis and a sustainable first step would be to
develop legislation that facilitates arbitration of medical malpractice
disputes.
186. S. Res. 160, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) (enacted).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 74-105.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 106-20.
189. See supra note 109. Arbitration is an adjudicatory procedure that is not intended
to encourage settlement between disputing parties. Instead, the arbitrator issues an award
and the parties are bound by the terms of the award. Id.
190. See Commission Report, supra note 164, at 34.
191. Id.
192. Id.

